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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16638

LESTER RALPH ROMERO,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with the criminal offense of
Theft by Receiving, a second degree felony.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted at a bench trial on April
2, 1979.

A Motion in Arrest of Judgment was heard and later

denied on May 17, 1979.

On August 20, 1979, the appellant was

sentenced to one to fifteen years in prison which was stayed
pending a ninety day evaluation at the prison and further
stayed pending this appeal.

The appellant was admitted to bail.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the trial court's
findings and its orders based thereon.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1

Although respondent is in substantial agreement Witt I

I
I

appellant's outline of events relevant to this appeal, a
number of

omm~ssions

and distortions contained in appellant's
I

Statement of Facts warrant attention.
I

First, appellant's account of the circumstances

\
i

leading to the impounding of appellant's truck is misleading I

I

because it omits pertinent facts contained in the record.
Appellant simply states that he refused to consent to a searer.

of the truck he was driving, a deputy county attorney ordered i
that the truck be seized, and Investigator Collins impounded
the vehicle and the documents it contained.

In fact, Inves-

tigator Collins testified that in his attempt to determine
ownership of the truck, he explained in detail to appellant
the peace officer responsibility to dispose of the vehicle
in accordance with its owners wishes (R. 109).

Appellant thenl
I

told Investigator Collins that the truck belonged to the
i

Golden Circle Investment Corp., that Mr. Bill Hamilton should'
be contacted, but appellant could not supply a number at whict,
Mr. Hamilton could be reached (R. 109, 110, 113).

In accorda:

with standard procedure the vehicle was impounded.
Second, appellant's assertion that no impound inn~
was made is erroneous.

Investigator Collins testified that

the scene of the arrest he and Sargeant Harwood inventoried

a'.

t
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contents of the truck, describing specifically the papers
taken with him for safekeeping and listing generically the
items left in the rear of the vehicle (R. 113, 114).

Inves-

tigator Collins later dictated a report containing the
inventory list using the notes he made at the scene (R. 115) •
Investigator Collins stated that papers, documents, and items
of apparent value were strewn across the front seat of the
truck (R. 115, 116, 117).

The defensive action of inventorying

the contents of the truck was appropriate in light of Investigator Collins well-founded fear that he and his employer
might be the target of false accusations of theft (R. 119) .
Investigator Collins action of opening the envelope offered
as Exhibit 4 was motivated by the same desire to protect the
owner, himself,

and the County Attorney's Office (R. 124).

It was apparent to Investigator Collins that the envelope
contained a check or money order and under the circumstances
the only reasonable course of action was to open the envelope
and determine the exact value of its contents.
Third, appellant claims the search conducted by
Investigator Collins was clearly investigatory in nature
(App. brief p. 3).

In support of this contention he offers

the fact that Investigator Collins listed generically those
items of little apparent value which he left in the truck.
The fact that some miscellaneous tools, fishing gear, and
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mechanical equipment were left in the truck becomes a hollow
basis for appellant's argument when viewed in the light of
Investigator Collins' testimony.

The record reveals Inves-

tigator Collins was concerned only with protecting the owner\
I

property from vandals and himself from accusations of theft
(R. 241, 242).

This singular motive was evidenced by the fac:\

I
testimony I

that he offered to return the seized papers to appellants
previous attorney, Mr. Bown, who corroborated this
(R. 263, 264).

Fourth, appellant's assertion that Investigator
Collins "had no probable cause to believe that any of the
items seized were contraband, instrumentalities, or evidence
of an offense" misleads by innuendo.

This representation

implies that Investigator Collins must have had probable
cause to conduct the search when in fact probable cause
considerations are irrelevant to an inventory search.
Fifth, appellant claims information used by the
county attorney's office to obtain a search warrant could
have been gained only through access to privileged attorney· I
!

client conversation.

Appellant moved to arrest judgment

based on "newly discovered" information which would support
this allegation.

1

Appellant stated the newly discovered

evidence was Mr. McLachlan's admission that he was the
confidential informant who passed on information received
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through access to privileged conversation (R. 225).

Appellant

never did present such testimony despite the fact that Mr.
McLachlan was present and apparently willing to testify when
the motion to arrest judgment was argued (R. 303).
Appellant's argument that information used to obtain
the search warrant was gained in violation of an attorneyclient privilege is clouded by appellant's own testimony.
Appellant testified that he could have talked to"somebody"
about the papers taken from the truck "at other times"

(R. 160,

161) •

POINT I
THE INVENTORY SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S
VEHICLE WAS REASONABLE AND THEREFORE
NOT A VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMeNT.
Appellant condemns as unreasonable the seizure of
papers for safekeeping by officers conducting an inventory
search of the vehicle appellant was driving at the time of
his arrest.

It is undisputed that the Fourth Amendment forbids

unreasonable searches.

However, courts have long recognized

that inventory searches are reasonable and, therefore, an
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

This

inventory exception was developed in order to insure protection
of the owner's property, to protect the police against claims
or disputes over lost or stolen property, and to protect the
police from dangerous instrumentalities.

South Dakota v.
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I

I

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed.2d 1000, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976;:
I

In determining whether police have engaged genuineh;
in a caretaking search of an impounded vehicle, the United
States

Suprem~

Court in the Opperman case, supra, focused

upon several factors as being dispositive of the issue.
are:

They

the vehicle is lawfully impounded; the owner is not

present or available to make other arrangements for the safe·
keeping of his belongings; the inventory is prompted by the
presence in plain view of a number of valuables inside the
vehicle; and that this standard procedure is not a pretext
concealing an investigatory motive.
As the record in the instant case reveals, this
outlined in Opperman, supra, is easily satisfied.

Testimony

disclosed that appellant was under full custodial arrest
pursuant to a felony warrant.

Appellant disclaimed ownership;
I

of the vehicle and its contents and he could not locate an
authorized agent of the corporate owner of the truck.

I

Arres~
I

officers relayed this information to a deputy county attorney'
who advised them to follow the standard procedure of
the vehicle.

impound~I

Investigator Collins testified that only aftu.

calling a tow truck to impound the vehicle did he realize the;
necessity of inventorying its contents.

The judgment was mai'

upon the observation of several papers and documents of
apparent value strewn across the front seat of the truck.
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During the inventory Investigator Collins found several bank
checks drawn upon different accounts, one in the amount of
over $1,000.00.

Investigator Collins also discovered an

executed deed to real property, a title abstract, and a
sealed addressed envelope.

Close examination of the envelope

revealed that it contained a check or money order.

Investigator

Collins testified that this discovery prompted him to open
the envelope to determine the exact value of its contents.
This action to protect the owner's property and to protect
himself and his employer from subsequent allegations of theft
was reasonable due to the ease with which an envelope could
be opened.
Appellant cites United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
53 L.Ed.2d 538, 97 S.Ct. 2476 (1977), as controlling in the
instant case.

Chadwick involved the warrantless search of a

double locked footlocker officers believed contained contraband.
In Chadwick, supra, the Supreme Court stated that the fact
that the footlocker was double locked indicated an expectation
that its contents remain concealed from public view.

This

expectation of privacy could be violated only after officers
had secured a search warrant.

This singular consideration of

Chadwick renders it easily distinguishable from the instant
case which involved dual competing considerations.

It is

conceded that there is an expectation of privacy in sealed
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envelopes.

However, the record of the instant case reveals,

unlike Chadwick, that the contents of the envelope were
discernable upon outward examination.

Investigator Collins

saw through the envelope that it contained not a personal
letter but a check or money order.

This discovery diminished:

the importance of the privacy interest and emphasized the
need to protect the arresting officers and department from
subsequent accusations of theft.
need to safeguard the property.

It also crystalized the
For unlike the situation

in Chadwick, a thief could easily substitute an empty
facimile for the envelope impounded or exchange the contents
.of the envelope leaving no sign of tampering.

For example,

the owner could have claimed that the money orders he found
in the envelope upon its return were not those he originally
placed in it which were of greater value.

The police having

impounded an item so easily tampered with would be helpless
to refute such a claim.
The obvious inference to be drawn from appellant's
argument is that Investigator Collins gave false testimony regarding the inventory nature of the search.

Appellant allege;

contrary to Investigator Collins' testimony, the search was
merely a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.
logic of this argument is seriously flawed.

For if Investigi:

Collins had been willing to lie regarding the purpose of the
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search he would also have lied about the very existence of
the envelope.

Such a lie would certainly have better served

the alleged purpose of the search.
The questions of the reasonableness of the search
and the veracity of the witness' testimony were resolved by
the trial court.

That ruling should not be upset unless

persuasively shown to be in error.
120 (Utah 1976).

State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d

This standard for appellate review was

elaborated upon by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Criscola,
444 P.2d 517 (Utah 1968).

In that case the Court stated:

Due to the responsibility of the trial
court in controlling the admissibility
of evidence, and his advantage position
to pass on such matters, it is his
prerogative to make this determination.
For these reasons his ruling should be
indulged with a presumption of correctness
and should not be disturbed unless it
clearly appears that he was in error.
[Citations omitted.]
Id.at 519.
Respondent submits that the inventory search was
reasonable and, therefore the trial court's ruling should
be upheld.
POINT II
THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE SEARCH
WARRANT CONTAINED A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS
TO SUPPORT THE MAGISTRATE'S PROBABLE
CAUSE DETERMINATION
Appellant contends Investigator Collins' affidavit
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did not contain facts from which a magistrate could assess
the credibility of the confidential informant and therefore
it was inadequate to support a probable cause determination.
This contention must be analyzed in the context of those
Supreme Court cases which have defined probable cause for
the purpose of obtaining a search warrant.

I

Beck v. Ohio,

1

379 U.S. 89, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 85 S.Ct. 223 (1964), established
the proposition that only a probability, and not a prirna

facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probabl\
cause.

The Beck standard was affirmed in McCray v. Illinois,

386 U.S. 300, 87 s.ct. 1056 (1967), which held that affadavit
.of probable cause are tested by much less rigorous standards
than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial.
In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741

f

{Bil

the Supreme Court granted magistrates much leeway in making
probable cause determinations.

The Ventresca Court stated,

"magistrates are not to be confined by niggardly limitations
or by restrictions on the use of their common sense." Id.

ad

Consistent with Ventresca, supra, was the earlier case of
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725 (1960).
In Jones, supra, the Court held that an affadavit in support
of a search warrant should be considered adequate if there
is a "substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay it cont~
The Jones Court also noted tnat a magistrates determination
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of probable cause should be granted great deference by
reviewing courts. Id. at 271.
In the context of these cases appellant's emphasis
on the fact that the affadivit contained no averment that the
confidential informant had furnished reliable tips in the
past must be interpreted as an hypertechnical concern with
the wording of the affadavit.
In support of his argument appellant cites the case
of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637,
89 s.ct. 584 (1969), in which the United States Supreme court
applied and explained the test for probable cause announced
in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 84 S.Ct.
1509 (1964).

These cases require that the affadavit contain

information concerning underlying circumstances to allow the
magistrate to judge the validity of the informant's conclusion
and averments regarding past performance to support the
reliability of an informants tip.
The first prong of this test is easily satisfied in
the present case.

The confidential informant stated that

appellant told him a stolen black and silver semi-tractor
truck was being kept at the ABC storage unit.

Appellant was

also linked to ABC through an envelope addressed to ABC containing money orders which was found in his vehicle at the
time of his arrest.

Additional information connecting

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
-11-

appellant to the stolen truck in the A.B.C. storage unit
came from Mr. Ron Lyle an inmate at the Utah State Prison.
Mr. Lyle admitted having stolen the semi-tractor at appellant''

request.

Mr .. Lyle provided a detailed description of the

truck including the alteration of its color which corroboratJ
the confidential informant's statement.

Mr.

Lyle also placed,

the stolen truck in the A. B. C. storage unit ten months prior
to the application of the warrant.

I

An independent police

investigation of the theft of the truck corroborated Mr. Ly!E
statement.

Finally, the owner of A.B.C. storage linked

appellant to the storage unit through identification of the
_addressed envelope which was strikingly similar to those
he usually received containing rent for the unit.
Mr. Lyle's statement against interest, corroboratec
by independent sources, in conjunction with the confidential

informant's tip which was also supported by additional
information provided a substantially detailed basis for
crediting the hearsay contained in the affadavit.

~

States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 580, 29 L.Ed.2d 723, 91 S.~
2075 (1971).

See also: State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (1977);1

State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972); and
State v. Smelser, 23 Utah 2d 347, 463 P.2d 562 (1970).
Although the affadavit in the present case contat

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-12Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

no statement of prior reliability the United States Supreme
Court in the Harris case, supra, observed that such statements
were unnecessary since the inquiry as to probable cause
concerns whether the informer's present tip was truthful or
reliable.
P. 2d 846

See also State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499
(1972).
In the present case the magistrate was presented

with an affadavit containing a complex pattern of detailed
corroborated information.

Appellant attacks the sufficiency

of the affadavit because it does not contain a statement
regarding the past performance of the confidential informant
or a statement of whether the named informant received a
benefit in exchange for his information.

In the Harris case,

supra, the United States Supreme Court observed that neither
statement urged as requisite by the appellant are necessary
to a probable cause determination if a substantial basis for
finding probable cause is evident.

Respondent submits that

the affadavit in question meets this standard.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO COMPEL
DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The.State has a privilege to refuse to disclose
the identity of an informer unless the trial court finds that
his identity has already been disclosed or disclosure is
essential to assure a fair determination of the issues.
Rules of Evidence, Rule 36.

Utah

The defendant has the burden of

demonstrating that the informant would be a material witness
on the issue of guilt.

State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135,

139, 514 P.2d 800, 803 (1973).

Further, a defendant may

not compel disclosure of an informant's identity to contest
the probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
Id. at 138, 514 P.2d at 802.

Respondent avers that

appel~~

has not carried his burden of showing that the informant was
a material witness.

I

Appellant argues that he was prevented from raising'
a Sixth Amendment violation at the suppression hearing.

In

fact appellant was concerned at the hearing with challenging,
I

the validity of the search.

In addition, there was ample

testimony indicating that no Sixth Amendment violation had
occurred.

Investigator Collins testified that the source of

the informer's tip was the appellant himself who told others
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during a conversation at a trailer park that he had a stolen
truck in storage at A.B.C.

The informer was specifically

told that privileged information was not wanted by the
prosecutors office.
Most of the cases focusing upon Rule 36 have
involved situations where disclosure is relevant and helpful
to the accused's defense or is necessary for a fair determination of the issues.

Courts have uniformly recognized:

An appellant seeking to overcome the
state's policy of protecting an informant's
identity, has the burden of proving that the
informant is likely to have evidence bearing
on the merits of the case . . . His burden
extends only to a showing that, in view of
the evidence, the informer would be a material
witness on the issue of guilt which might
result in exoneration and that nondisclosure
of his identity would deprive the-defendant
of a fair trial.
State v. Tuell, 541 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Ariz. 1975).

In the

present case, appellant has not made any showing as to
how the informant's testimony would have been material to
the issue of appellant's guilt.

In addition, appell'ant

could easily have subpoenaed the person he felt was the
informant as a witness if the informant's testimony would
have helped appellant's defense.

As the Supreme Court of

Colorado recently stated:
. the accused is required to
make at least a minimal affirmative
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showing of the need for disclosure; and
. . . a defendant's mere unsupported
assertion that he desires disclosure is
not enough. A defendant's speculations,
without more, will not support a conclusion that the informant would be of any
substantial assistance in his defense.
People v. Langford, Colo., 550 P.2d 329 (1976).

See also

State v. Bankhead, 514 P.2d 800 (Utah 1973).
Finally, and most importantly, it is clear from
the record that appellant in fact knew the identity of the
informant.
testify.

Nevertheless, appellant did not call him to
Appellant's failure to call Mr. McLachlan is

inconsistent with his present argument that Mr. McLachlan's
.testimony would have been relevant to his defense.
In the recent case of Lopez v. State, 574 S.W. 2d
563 (Tex. Cr. App. 1978), the court held that although
normally disclosure would be required if the informant playe
a prominent part in bringing the offense about or was a
material witness, where the defendant and his counsel

~

the identity of the informer and there is no indication that
the defendant could not have produced the informant as a
witness or that his testimony is unavailable, it is not errc
to refuse to compel disclosure.
v. Hull, 487 P.2d 1314

To the same effect is ~

(Mont. 1971).

Respondent submits that the trial court's ruling
not to disclose the identity of the confidential informant
not erroneous.

1

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
-16- by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT IV
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT BECAUSE APPELLANT
FAILED TO CARRY HIS BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD
ON THE MOTION.
Appellant moved to arrest judgment based on "newly
discovered" information.

This information consisted of Mr.

McLachlan's admission that he was the confidential informant
who passed on information received from a privileged conversation (R. 225) .

Appellant never did present such testimony

despite the fact that Mr. McLachlan was present and apparently
willing to testify (R. 303).
Instead appellant presented testimony of Mr. Bown,
appellants former attorney, indicating that appellant had
discussed the contents of the A.B.C. storage unit with him
in the presence of Mr. McLachlan.

Mr. Bown's testimony is

not relevant to the issue because he could not testify regarding
additional conversations appellant may have had with other
individuals.

Appellant argues that the case of Black v.

United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966) and that of O'Brien v.
United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1966) established a per se rule
requiring reversal of any conviction if the case involved
any breach of secrecy of attorney-client communications
(App. brief p. 21).

This argument is without merit.

The

United States Supreme court in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545, 51 L.Ed.2d 30, 90 S.Ct. 837 (1977) stated:
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We cannot agree that these cases,
individually or together, either require or suggest the rule announced
by the Court of Appeals and now urged
by Bursey. Both Black and O'Brien
involved surreptitious electronic
surveillance by the Government, which
was discovered after trial and conviction
and which was plainly illegal under the
Fourth Amendment.
In each case, some,
but not all, of the conversations overheard were between the criminal defendant
and his counsel during trial preparation.
The conviction in each case was set aside
and a new trial ordered.
The explanatory
per curiarn in Black, although referring
to the overheard conversations with counsel,
did not rule that whenever conversations
with counsel are overheard the Sixth
Amendment is violated and a new trial must
be had.
Indeed, neither the Sixth Amendment
nor the right to counsel was even mentioned
in the short opinion.
It is difficult to
believe that the Court in Black and O'Brien
was evolving a definitive construction of
the Sixth Amendment without identifying
the Amendment it was interpreting, especially
in view of the well-established Fourth
Amendment grounds for excluding the fruits
of the illegal surveillance.
Id. at 432.
The Weatherford Court in discussing the contours
of Sixth Amendment Rights stated that violation of those
rights would occur only if there was tainted evidence, a
communication of defense strategy to the prosecution, and
a purposeful intrusion by an agent.

The evidence in this

case fell short of satisfying the Weatherford test.
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The evidence presented by appellant at the hearing
on his motion to arrest judgment failed to establish a Sixth
Amendment violation.

Appellant's failure to call Mr. McLachlan

and his failure to present evidence in the light of testimony
by the prosecution witness that no privileged information
was obtained by the prosecution require affirmance of the
ruling denying the motion to arrest judgment.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the routine inventory search
conducted by Investigator Collins was constitutional and
therefore the prosecution was not obligated to ignore the
nature of items impounded.

In addition the search of the A.B.C.

storage unit was made pursuant to a search warrant and was
valid.
Appellant has failed to carry his burden in
that rulings of the lower court were erroneous.

establishi~g

Therefore this

conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
OLGA AGNELLO-RASPA
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-19Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

